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REPORT AND ECOMEUDATICN OF -LE' PESIDESNT
O0 THE E2UC-TnVE DIRECTORS ONlg A PROPOSED LOAN TO
THE 1:O7EA DEVEL'OP,E2NT F -NiiANCE CORPORATION
1. I submit the folloiinrg report and recommendation on a proposed
loarn in an amount in various currencies equivalent to $55.0 million to the
Korea Development Finance Corporation (KDFC) to be guaranteed by the Republic
of Korea. Interest on the loan7 would 'be at 8-1/2 percent per annum. The
loan would be repaid in conformity with a schedule based on the aggregate
of the amortization schedules of K.GDFCs sub-loans, which would have a maxi-
mum repayment period of 18 years, including three years of grace.
PART I - THE ECONOMY
2. The latest Economic Report ("Current Economic Position and Prospects
of the Republic of Korea") was distributed under cover of SecM75-437 dated
June 9, 1975. The Country Data Sheets are attached as Annex I. An Industrial
Sector Mission visited Korea in the fall of 1974; its report is under prepara-
tion.
3. Korea's economic performance over the last decade has been out-
standing. It entered the sixties with one of the lowest income levels in
the world; it had little experience of participation in international trade;
and 4t lacked natural resources. Despite these unpromising beginnings,
Korea embarked on a course of export-oriented industrial growth that has
led to its recogni tion as one of the most successful examples of development.
Its rich endowment with the human capabilities for economic success, the
availability of considerable entrepreneurial talent, a social environment
which is conducive to rapid economic change, and a national dedication to
unambiguous economic goals, all contributed to Korea's impressive performance.
In the period 1964-74, the GNP growth rate averaged 10 percent a year in
real terms, reaching the record level of 16.5 percent in 1973. This, together
with a decline in population growth (from about 2.7 percent per year at the
beginning of the period to about 1.7 percent at present), caused per capita
income to more than double in the period. The mainspring of economic growtn
has been the increase of manufactured exports (from about $65 million in
1964 to over $4 billion in 1974). The ratio of exports to GNP rose rapidly
from 4 percent in 1964 to 27 percent in 1974, and the manuf-acturing sector
as a proportion of GNP increased from 12 percent to 28 percent in the same
period. Agriculture, despite an annual growth rate of about 3.5 percent
during the last decade, declined as a proportion of GNP (from 43 percent
in 1964 to 23 percent in 1974).
4. Total real investment grew ten-fold between 1964 and 1974, and
the ratio of investment to GNP rose from 13 percent to 29 percent. External
resource requirements also grew rapidly, averaging about 9 percent of GNP
during 1970-71, roughly the same level as in the early 1960's. The marginal
saving rate during the last eca&e r 3G per-c, waaca} anccacas .
caoital i:LaflCws d-i.d not ie.0n 0 .o .r.obi_ze res:ources cam.uv-;, .
However, Koren eatarecf uioo. a ,eiod oz, rapid growi_i.l wnita a vc-ry loW
of domestic svnings and, Ll-' h---e_orE t'oe Goveriament uri-suec a noicy . ela-
tively heav7y -"enendence or- e xt-ez.al ca pLtal ia the interesL or a rapic, ac-
:elerationL o: inves-tfIment arn. gowxtl_ Moreover, since expo -ts dur-ia,, -;964-7J4
were rising at an average .- C-e o'- nearly 4;7 parceTi, -, E urden ot additional
external debit was not exciess ve 7e the 2ebt service ratico sz.ood at arou-Lnd
'13 percent in 1974.
Korea7s perf 'ormarnce fin attempting to achieve a balanced distri4bution
oL the benefits of g-ro-w-th is also creciita beo tIOwev rV despit e thae fact Ihat
income dist- u 0on i1, K ,rea,8 i3 ge ne nral y mor.e equ tcu b e t -han in. coriparable
developi*ng ccun.t; ries * tie a solu:e Lap i incomes between the u--rban a---, rural
areas widenr.ed durig the ha C'ds despite subs,ar.t-ia, mig r_ to -The cit-ies,
a modest reductzio.n i-n t_h farm -oonulazion, andl h1-i`h1 yiclds nS>er unit of landci
under cultivation. Go-M.roth o-f labor productivity n. agricultu-e was neverthe-
less considerably s.ower tben in manufacturing. S-ince 1967, thle Government
has attempte Lo ra- se rZarin incomes ard to Drovide 9theL incentives .or
increasing foodgrair. productl on through a price support system covering rice
and barley. It T-i-oadened its efforts to achieve more wide1y and evenly dis-
tr_buted income- grovth by pursuing policies ofE decentralizing ancustry and
emphasizring investment in the less developed regions. A'so, in- 1971, the
Government i-ti-ated 'the Sae Maeal ,New Community-J Movemen'. as a rnationwide
sel'f-help program, aimed at increasing productivity and incomes (especially
in the rurall areas wh41e-re nearly half tuhe populatior. stil. lives) and at
improving tib cs1 ty o>- ru-al 'lfe. Par-ly as a result o3f tfhese various
measures, avergag raral household incomes are now nearly in lIne withn those
ofL average ub-bn households.
Recent Trends
6. 3-.tDuring the last three years the Korean econo.iic sLtuation has
oeeri subject ':o sudden and ch,:: c.hages. BeginnIng with the latter part
of 1972, the Korean economy ezDerienced aen unprecedented boom. 1973 was an
exceptional year, eve-,. by Kor:ean standards, and set new -ecords of growth
in GNP, exports and s:v-Lngs T.n the latter part of 1973, Korean economic
aspirations we-re e,rpressed -rL terms oF offic-:al targets for the early 1980's
of $1,000 pe-r capit-a and $1C' billion of exports. The long-term strategy
imPlied the cont-inuat-ion over tlne next decade oF an overall rate of GI\T
growth of about 13 percent per ann-um but weLth reduced depeandence, in rela-
tive terms, on ne-t infl"Lows from atroad.
7. The favorable ecomomic develo?ments of 1973 were interrupted by
external developments in 1974. The shar-p -rise in the price of petroleum
beginning in late 973. thae recession in the Japanese and U.S. economies irn
1974, and t.he 'iogh level of food-g-uain and other import -prices, combined to
bring about a. major change IV t1he short-term economic position of Korea.
Ow-ng to its poor natural resoun:ce endowment and 'because of its economic
structure and ,r-oawth strategy, Korea was sevarely atfected by these
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international developments. Merchandise exports now account for about 24
percent of GNP in Korea; and dependence on the Japanese and U.S. markets
remains heavy, notwithstanding the Government's efforts to diversify export
markets by encouraging sales in the Middle East, Europe and Latin America.
8. The higher costs of energy and food imports alone have placed a
severe burden on the economy and the balance of payments. Korean dependence
on imported fuels is not only extremely heavy but is also very closely
linked to essential industrial and transport uses. The additional cost of
petroleum added almost $800 million to the import bill in 1974 (considerably
more than twice the current account deficit in 1973) and a doubling of the
prices of foodgrains increased foreign exchange requirements in 1974 by more
than $300 million, despite a decline in the volume of these imports. Together
petroleum and foodgrains accounted for about 45 percent of Korea's increased
import bill in 1974 and 25 percent of total import payments. The cost of
imported raw materials and intermediate goods also increased appreciably and
compounded the balance of payments problem. The magnitude of the effects
of these adverse developments can be gauged by the fact that Korea's terms
of trade deteriorated by 18 percent, or about 5 percent of GNP, in 1974
compared with 1973.
9. Notwithstanding the very serious terms of trade loss, the Korean
economy might have been able to avoid a major slowdown but for a simulta-
neous setback to export growth. Real export growth, which had reached the
peak of 52 percent per annum during 1972-73, slowed down to 9 percent
during 1974 and may come down further to only 4 percent in 1975. This sharp
decline in export growth is attributable directly to the deep recession in
the U.S. and Japan, Korea's major trade partners. The volume of Korean
exports to Japan is estimated to have declined by about 6 percent during 1974,
and Korea's trade deficit with Japan widened to $1.2 billion compared to $0.5
billion in 1973. The volume of exports to the U.S. increased even -in 1974.
It is noteworthy that Korean exports to countries oth'r than the U.S. and
Japan showed a marked real increase of 40 percent during 1974, which if sus-
tained will denote considerable success with the market diversification effort.
10. Imported inflation has also led to a very sharp upward pressure on
the domestic price level. In addition to the sharply higher prices of
imported petroleum and foodgrains, the average unit value of other imports
increased by 45 percent during 1974. Consequently, the rate of domestic
inflation accelerated; in calendar year 1974, consumer prices rose by about
26 percent and wholesale prices increased by about 45 percent. Since the
middle of 1974, the rate of domestic inflation has slowed somewhat, reflect-
ing seasonal factors, the slower increase in the prices of imported goods
and the dampening effects of rising inventories of manufactured goods.
Government Policy Response
11. Until the end of 1974, the Government followed policies which were
based on the premise that the economy should remain poised to capitalize on
the worldwide economic recovery, which Korea expected would commence by
-4-
early 1975. Thus, the principal objectives of policy in 1974 were to ease
the adjustment to higher oil and other import prices, while cushioning the
impact of the recession to avoid unduly slowing domestic investment and
employment growth.
12. In general, the Government has been committed to accepting neces-
sary price adjustments arising from higher energy and other import costs;
one major exception to th:is general policy was its unxwillingness to place
on consumers the full burden of higher import costs of basic foodstuffs.
Thus, despite increases in prices paid by consumers for foodgrains, substan-
tial subsidies are involved in the sale of wheat and rice. Complete avoid-
ance of subsidies at a time of growing unemployment and declining real wages
in manufacturing would have been difficult. Nevertheless, the Government
fully recognizes the distortions in the price structure resulting from these
large subsidies and is greatly concerned with the heavy burden they have
placed on the budget. Thus, remodelling of the price structure is a major
objective of the Government.
13. Selective credit measures to assist the most distressed industries
were another element in the Government's effort to cushion the impact
of recession in 1974. These measures were inten(led to enable industry to
finance stocks of specified raw materials, and to carry raw materials and
finished goods inventories that had become excessive as a result of the
decline in export demand. Small- and medium-sized firms which were particu-
larly hard hit by the onset of the recession were assisted by a large credit
program embracing both working capital and investment loans. These firms
also benefitted from a preferential (government subsidized) interest rate of
12 percent, 3 percent below the normal bank rate on such loans. Similarly,
special subsidized credit facilities were made avrailable to the machinery
industries and to finance equipment purchases by export industries. All told,
such programs provided credits totalling some l 2OO billion ($495 million),
equivalent to over 20 percent of the increase in total credit to the private
sector in 1974. Overall monetary policy, which had been made quite tight 
in
the first half of the year, was significantly eased after mid-year. The
increase in domestic credit in the second half of last year was more than
double that in the January-June period and, over the year as a whole, domestic
credit expanded by about 50 percent compared with an increase of only about
30 percent in 1973. However, owing to the contractionary influence of the
external deficit, the money supply increased by only about 30 percent,
compared with 40 percent in 1973.
14. In December 1974, the Government introduced a further set of
special measures to offset the sluggish demand for exports and to relieve
the liquidity problems of exporters. It expanded the program of export
financing, undertook to purchase excess inventories of finished goods from
industries particularly hard hit by the fall in export demand, and increased
credits to exporters for the purchase of imported and domestic materials.
On December 7, 1974, the currency was devalued by 17.5 percent to W 485 
Der
U.S. dollar. The devaluation was not expected to increase exports appreciably
because of the depressed state of Korea's overseas markets, but like some 
of
the other measures, it was intended to improve the liquidity position of
manufacturing enterprises. It should also improve the competitive position
of import substitution industries which had been weakened during the year.
But the devaluation will also contribute to continued inflationary pressures
in 1975. Among measures taken by the Government to help the low income
groups are substantial income tax relief, a 30 percent increase in salaries
of Government employees and the initiation of public works projects, mainly
in the urban areas, to alleviate unemployment. The rural areas appear to
have been hit less hard by the economic slowdown. The terms of trade moved
further in favor of the farmers during 1974 as the support price for rice
was adjusted sharply upward.
15. It was largely because of the efforts to sustain the 1973 momentum
of growth that the real GNP rose in 1974 by more than 8 percent; sizeable
gains were recorded in both consumption and investment. However, notwith-
standing the support provided by Government, there was a sharp slowdown in
industrial output, private fixed investment and export sales in the second
half of 1974.
16. The impact of the adverse turn of events in 1974 was borne primarily
by the balance of payments. The current account deficit widened from $0.3
billion in 1973 to $1.8 billion in 1974 and may be somewhat larger in 1975.
Even this expectation assumes a substantial improvement in the latter half
of this year, since the current account deficit in the first four months of
1975 alone amounted to $1.2 billion; however, by April there were signs that
import and export trends were coming into better balance. The financing of
the 1974 deficit involved a very large reduction ($738 million) in net
international reserves (to $300 million); so far this year the continued
deficit has meant further reduction in net international reserves which are
now substantially negative. The financing of the large anticipated balance
of payments deficit for 1975 will require a major increase in disbursements
of medium- and long-term loans.
Longer-Term prospects
17. Before the international developments of late 1973 and 1974, Korea
appeared to be set on an economic course which could have led to its exceed-
ing its long-range economic goals. However, the changes since the long-term
framework was formulated in 1973 have necessitated a re-examination of both
the objectives and the strategy. Although revised plans have not been
completed, it appears that the target for the average annual increase in
GNP will be lowered to 8 percent, and that the pattern of future growth
will be somewhat different from that originally envisioned. Nevertheless,
industrial development will remain an important element of the strategy.
Greater emphasis is also being given to increasing agricultural production
and rural incomes. Korea's developmental strategy will, of course, have to
be kept under close and constant review, so as to adapt it to changing
circumstances. The preparation of the Fourth Plan (1977-81) affords an
opportunity for a careful reconsideration of strategy; the Government has
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been extended financial assistance by the UNDP to meet the cost of consultants
(and fellowships for Korean staff) to assist xith preparation of the Plan
during the next 12 months, and the Bank is acting as Executing Agency.
18. Korea will in all probability be capable of sustaining an annual
growth rate of GNP of 8 percent during the next decade, provided the large
external capital inflows required to meet the sizeable balance of payments
deficits are available on reasonable terms. Considering that 90 percent of
Korea's exports now consist of manufactured goods, that its links with the
Japanese economy remain strong, that vigorous efforts are being made to
penetrate new markets (especially in Europe and the Middle East) and that some
progress has already been made in diversifying the industrial structure, 
a
long-term real growth rate of exports of at least 12 percent appears possi-
ble even if world trade in manufactures should expand at a much slower rate.
Hlowever, this would represent a substantially slower export growth than in
the past, and Korean plans already envisage greater emphasis on import
substitution in three key areas (a) foodgrains, (b) energy and (c) machinery
production, all of which xwill probably mean sharply higher investment costs
per unit of output.
19. The Government is aware of the need for careful monetary and 
fiscal
management in the months ahead. The ability to contain the balance of 
pay-
ments deficits will depend partly on the speed of the recovery of exports
and partly on the Government's determination to narrow the fiscal deficit
and to reduce the rate of domestic credit creation. However, substantial
reduction in the current account deficit is likely to take several years
unless the upturn in the U.S., Japanese and other OECD economies is very
sharp in the years after 1975. Finding the means to finance the external
deficits will continue to be Korea's most urgent economic challange. The
servicing of the sizeable foreign borrowing required should not pose serious
difficulties for Korea given the rates and the long-term prospects for
continued export growth, provided that the proportion of debt incurred on
short- and medium-terms and at high interest rates is not excessive. 
The
debt service ratio stood at about 13 percent at the end of 1974. It is
expected to rise moderately to around 16 percent by 1980 and decline to 
less
than 15 percent by the mid-1980's.
PART II - BANK GROUP OPEiRATIONS
20. As of May 31, 1975, Korea had received 20 Bank Loans and
8 IDA Credits, amounting in total to $799.7 million in loans and $107.0
million in credits (taking into account cancellations and the refinancing
of one IDA Credit in a subsequent Bank loan).
21. Nearly one-half of the total has been for the transport sector 
--
$219.7 million for railways, $101.5 million for highways and $80 million for
ports. Of the $130.5 million which has been lent for agriculture projects,
$93 million has gone for irrigation projects, $7 million for livestock de-
velopment, $10.5 million for the provision of medium and long-term credit
through the National Agricultural Cooperative Federation (NACF), $7 million
for seeds production and $13.0 million for an Integrated Agricultural Prod-
ucts Processing project. The Korea Development Finance Corporation (KDFC)
has received $95 million and the Korea Development Bank (KDB) $60 million in
Bank loans for relending to private industry.
22. Excluding one project that was subsequently cancelled, IFC had,
by May 31, 1975, entered into eight commitments: five in the financial
sector and one each in the fields of textiles, electrical and electronic
products, and synthetic fibers, totalling (net of participations and cancel-
lations) $30.1 million. An investment in a tourism project has been subse-
quently approved. Currently, IFC has under advanced consideration a zinc
smelting and a project involving the leasing of industrial equipment; under
preliminary consideration are projects in the fields of steel products,
cement distribution, electric motors, bearings, and tire manufacturing.
23. Korea's ambitious industrial development programs require large
capital expenditures in the private sector, a situation which enhances the
need for IFC presence. W4ith the closer relationship established as a re-
sult of recent promotional efforts, we expect IFC's activities to continue
expanding rapidly. IFC would seek projects that would: (i) result in
foreign exchange revenues or savings; (ii) contribute to modernize or deepen
the industrial structure; and (iii) increase value added in manufacturing.
24. As of May 31, 1975 about $361.9 million of the total Bank
lending remained undisbursed on effective Loans and Credits. The rate of
disbursements has increased in recent months. Annex II contains a summary
statement of Bank Loans, IDA Credits, and IFC Investments as of that date
and Notes on the execution of ongoing projects. As indicated in the Notes,
progress on project implementation is generally satisfactory, although dif-
ficulties have been encountered with some projects and most seriously with
the Pyongtaek-Kumgang and Yong San Gang Irrigation Projects (Loan 600 and
Loan 795/Credit 283, respectively).
25. The emphasis which the Government places on agricultural and rural
development will be reflected in the programs for FY76 and FY77. A second
livestock project, the second stage of the Yong San Gang Irrigation Project,
the Okseo irrigation and regional development projects and the Miho Cheon and
Naeseong-Cheon watershed development projects have already been identified
and are under preparation; a rural infrastructure project and follow-on
projects in agricultural credit and agricultural products processing are also
being considered.
26. The development of the industrial and agricultural sectors and
of exports will require concurrent infrastructural development. Although
the transport sector will be given relatively less emphasis than in the
past, the investments required are large, and thus there is considerable
support for this sector in the proposed program.
8-
27. The Government is intensifying its efforts to prepare projects
suitable for external official financing in the fields of infrastructure,
agriculture and regional development. The foreign exchange component of
such projects is low, partly because they consist largely of civil worlcs,
and Korea's construction industry is efficient and well organized and wins
an overwhelming proportion of contracts put out to international competi-
tion; its dependence on imports is expected to lessen in the future. More-
over, the country's capacity to meet its requirements of machinery and
equipment from domestic sources is also increasing. Korea's need for of-
ficial aid therefore cannot be met if financing is confined to the foreign
exchange costs of projects. For this reason the Bank should continue to be
prepared to finance, in appropriate cases, a portion of local costs.
28. The share of the Bank Group in Korea's total external debt (dis-
bursed) outstanding at tlhe end of 1974 was about 6.0 percent, and the share
of debt service was of the order of 2.4 percent at that time. These ratios
are expected to increase somewhat by the end of the present decade.
PART III - THE INDUSTRIAL SECTOR AND INDUSTRIAL FINANCING
29. The industrialization strategy followed by Korea over the last
decade was based on a recognition of the limitations placed on it by the
country's relative lack of natural resources. Planning for the develop-
ment of industry centered around the aim of expanding the export of manu-
factures rather than on concentrating entirely on import-substitution, as
many developing countries had done in the early 1960's. An important
ingredient in the success of this policy was the fact that formal education
in Korea had by the 1960's reached a level comparable with that of countries
with considerably higher income levels. This gave Korea the advantages of a
skilled and adaptable labor force as well as the ability to quickly develop
efficient managerial talent. Thus, Korea adopted a policy of developing
labor-intensive industries such as textiles, clothing, electronics and
plywood, whose capital requirements are modest. In this respect, it is
noteworthy that the expansion of Korea's industrial structure in recent
years (1970-74) absorbed only 23 percent of total fixed investment, and
that value added per worker increased by about 10 percent per annum over the
last decade, reaching about $2,000 in 1974. The extent to which the Korean
economy depended on its light industry can also be gauged from the fact that
in 1972 it accounted for nearly 90 percent of the exports of the manufactur-
ing sector and about 80 percent of the value of total merchandise exports.
30. This strategy served Korea well in a period of continuous growth,
but it has also made Korean industry vulnerable in a time of recession.
Korea's industrial plans in recent years have, therefore, been aimed at
diversifying the economy and developing more integrated industries. Since
1970, over half of the total industrial investment has been allocated to
chemical, petroleum and basic metal industries to ensure the supply of raw
materials at stable prices. The establishment of Korea's first integrated
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steel plant at Pohang (currently being expanded from 1 million to 2.6
million tons), the large shipyard at Ulsan, and the naphtha cracking plant
and related operations at the Ulsan oil refining complex, marked the first
steps in the deepening of the industrial structure.
31. The recent economic setbacks have necessitated a re-examination of
the long-term development plans and the strategy underlying them. W4hile the
emphasis on increasing the share of heavy industry in exports and on enhan-
cing the domestic content of manufactures remains generally valid, the
program of heavy and chemical industries is being critically evaluated and
reoriented to meet changing circumstances; some heavy industry projects have
been deferred, if not altogether eliminated, especially those which are
extremely capital and energy intensive and those which will be heavily
dependent on foreign markets, foreign investment flows and imported raw
materials.
32. Notwithstanding the further changes in Korea's plans that are likely
to result from the re-examination of its industrial strategy, it is apparent
that the re-structuring and expansion of Korea's industrial sector will
require a heavy outlay of capital. The Governmet has embarked on a major
effort to mobilize the funds required by increasing domestic savings. A
National Investment Fund (NIF) was established in December 1973; it is
expected to finance a sizable proportion of the investment needs of Korea's
major industries by the early 1980's. The Minister of Finance is in charge
of the Fund but in effect delegates its managemet and operation to the
Governor of the Bank of Korea. The resources of the Fund will be mobilized
mainly by issuance of NIF-Bonds (which are purchased by banks, savings in-
stitutions and certain pension and trust funds) and the remainder by direct
subscription by the Government-. The funds will be on-lent through the
banking system for investments in fixed assets (about two-thirds) and for
working capital needs (one-third) of major industries.
33. The timely provision of long-term finance for the key industries
will depend to a large extent on the efficient operation of the NIF and the
tapping of other sources of funds such as Korea's three major development
finance companies - KDFC, KDB, and MIB. These three institutions were
responsible for 64 percent of total medium- and long-term loans in Korea in
1973. The proposed loan would be the fifth to KDFC. A first loan was made
to KDB (which is the largest financial intermediary in Korea) in March 1975,
and a loan for the MIB is also being considered in order to support the
Government's efforts to encourage the location of relatively small industrial
units in the rural areas and so increase off-farm employment opportunities.
The magnitude of the demand for term finance in Korea is such that these
three institutions, even if their operations increase significantly, will
continue to act in a complementary rather than a competitive manner.
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PART IV - THE PROJECT
34. A report entitled "Appraisal of Korea Development Finance Corpo-
ration" (No. 739-KO, dated June 25, 1975) is being distributed separately.
A Loan and Project Summary is attached as Annex III. Negotiations were held
in Washington on May 28 and 29, 1975 with a Korean delegation led by Mr. C.
H. Kim, President of KDFC.
The Company
35. KDFC, a privately owned company, was established in 1967 with the
assistance of the Bank Group (including an equity participation from IFC),
and the Federation of Korean Industries (FKI). KDFC has to date received
four Bank loans totalling $95 million, all of wqhich have been fully committed.
It also obtained its first loan from the Asian Development Bank (ADB) in
October 1974 for $30 million.
36. KDFC's performance remains satisfactory from both the developmental
and institutional standpoints. It has continued to improve the already high
standard of its internal operations, to maintain the quality of its portfolio,
and to exhibit an innovative approach to development banking.
37. Although remaining a relatively small source of finance for Korean
industry, KDFC has played an important qualitative role in contributing to
the improvement of the resource allocation and mobilization systems in
Korea. Its high appraisal standards have ensured that Bank funds and other
resources available to KDFC have been allocated to projects that were eco-
nomically as well as financially viable. (Data on a representative sample
of KDFC's projects showed an average economic rate of return of 31 percent
and a financial rate of return of 24 percent). KDFC-supported projects have
had a major economic impact in generating additional employment and increasing
value added and exports with considerable balance of payments benefits. As
a matter of policy, KDFC's portfolio is highly concentrated in export-oriented
projects; the 180 projects approved to date are expected to export annually
about $358 million equivalent or about 40 percent of their output. KDFC's
financing has shifted substantially over time, and its earlier concentration
on textiles, which accounted for about 30 percent of total lending up to
1970, has been sharply recluced as KDFC has become more heavily involved in
marine transport, deep-sea fishing and light industry. This has also brought
a discernible shift away i-rom Seoul in the geographic distribution of its
overall financing. 1KDFC has endeavored to improve the design of projects it
finances and has provided its clients wzith limited but useful managerial and
teclnical assistance. Its clientele is reasonably well diversified. Finally,
it has made a valuable contribution to improving the Korean financial system
through its initiative in promoting and establishing in 1971 the Korea
Investment and Finance Corporation (KIFC), a specialized financial institution
designed to develop the organized short-term money market and securities
market. KIFC's success led to the establishment since 1972 of nine similar
institutions, Tith a consequent expansion of the money market and improved
resource mobilization.
Management and Organization
38. KDFC's ownership is reasonably broad based and, aside from the IFC
which omns 14.1 percent of its share capital, no single shareholder (of
which there were 341 on December 31, 1974) owns more than 4 percent. Its
Board of Directors comprises 13 members of whom five represent foreign
private shareholders and the IFC. The eight Korean directors are leading
members of the business and banking community. IJhile the Board lays down
policy guidelines and has the ultimate authority for all investment decisions,
it has delegated authority to an Executive Committee of four Board members
(including the Chairman, the President, and two representatives of the
Korean and the foreign shareholders respectively) to approve individual
loans and investments up to $1.5 million.
39. KDFC remains one of the best organized and managed DFCs with which
the Bank Group is associated. Mr. C.H. Kim, formerly Governor of the Bank of
Korea, continues, as KDFC's President, to give the company strong
leadership. The high quality of KDFC's staff is evident through all levels
of the organization. Up to 1972, the turnover of staff had been minimal.
However, despite KDFC's competitive employment conditions vis-a-vis other
financial and banking institutions, staff turnover increased considerably
in 1973 and 1974, when 19 professional staff members left KDFC. This high
turnover was mainly the result of the demand for KDFC-trained staff by the
Korean business community (including some of KDFC's client companies). As
a result of this attrition and of its policy of limiting new recruits to
a number within its capacity to absorb efficiently and train adequately,
KDFC's professional staff increased only marginally from 42 to 44 in the last
two years, including 21 new recruits. However, KDFC believes that the turn-
over of staff will decline in 1975 and has made satisfactory plans for recruit-
ing additional professional staff over the next few years. Following a recent
review of its organizational structure, which has remained basically unun-
changed since its inception, KDFC's management has decided to create short-
ly a separate unit specifically to undertake project identification and pro-
motion work. The latter functions, which to date had been carried out by
KDFC's staff on an ad hoc basis, are expected to loom large in its future
work program. Its management is also considering the desirability of es-
tablishing, at an appropriate time, one or more regional offices to facili-
tate business contacts with existing and prospective clients outside the
greater Seoul area.
Operations and Resources
40. Since it began its lending operations in 1968, KDFC has approved
financial assistance for the industrial, mining, agro-industrial, fishery
and transport sectors amounting to a total of W 52.96 billion. Direct
lending accounted for 93.7 percent of the total and the remainder was
accounted for by equity investments and convertible debentures. Cumulative
loan approvals, as of December 31, 1974, totalledW 49.6 billion for 163
projects undertaken by 111 companies. Foreign currency loans (145) amounting
to $109.6 million accounted for 88.1 percent of KDFC's total lencling and for
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82.5% of its total financing. IWhile KDFC's approvals of Won loans increased
marginally to W 1.8 billion in 1974, compared with W 1.7 billion in 1973,
approvals of foreign currency loans declined by 16 percent to $26.8 million
($31.9 million in 1973). This decline was attributable partly to the reduced
level of industrial investment in the second half of 1974 but primarily due
to the fact that KDFC experienced an unexpected delay in securing its first
ADB loan (which eventually was made in October 1974).
41. With respect to equity investments and convertible debentures,
cumulative approvals for these operations amounted to W 3.3 billion for 31
companies. KDFC's equity investment activity expanded considerably during
1974, when it approved W 1,056 million for 12 companies.
42. KDFC's Statement of Operating Policies continues to provide ap-
propriate guidelines for its operations. In view of its proven ability
to make sound investment decisions and of the growing size of industrial
projects in Korea, it has been agreed that KDFC's normal exposure limit
in any single enterprise be revised from 15 percent to 20 percent of the
aggregate of paid-in capital, free resources and the Government subordinated
loan. This would raise the limit to about $3.3 million equivalent. To
assist projects requiring financing in excess of this amount, KDFC intends
to intensify its efforts to arrange joint-financing with other foreign and
domestic institutions, including the KDB.
43. As indicated earlier, the standard of KDFC's appraisal work
continues to be high. Several DFCs in other countries, to whom KDFC has
made available its appraisal reports, have benefitted from KDFC's appraisal
techniques. KDFC's evaluation of the technical, marketing and financial
aspects of projects has always been thorough. In recent years, the Bank
and KDFC have engaged in a dialogue aimed primarily at improving the
economic evaluation of its projects and this is now satisfactory. KDFC,
together with some other DFCs, is cooperating with the Bank in a pilot
scheme to develop a data bank to monitor the performance and benefits of
DFC-financed projects.
44. KDFC's supervisory work, which had suffered somewhat in the past
due to the lack of adequate technical personnel, is now fully satisfactory.
Furthermore, its Operations Department has revised the reporting require-
ments of its clients and has devised a system for monitoring the actual
financial and economic benefits of projects.
45. Until 1974, KDFC relied almost exclusively on the Bank for financ-
ing its foreign currency commitments, and had received four Bank loans
totalling $95 million. Additional foreign resources consisted only of a
"tied" $1 million loan from Caterpillar (Far East) Ltd., and a loan from
USAID of $5 million which was subsequently reduced to $3 million. This heavy
reliance on Bank funds was attributable mainly to the fact that the Government,
in its "aid management" policy, did not permit KDFC to approach other lend-
ing institutions, such as ADB, until 1973. In October 1974, KDFC received
its first loan from ADB for $30 million. In late 1973, KIFC resumed its
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soundings of foreign banks (which are also its shareholders), but found that
medium- and long-term funds were unavailable at an acceptable interest
rate. KDFC has since approached IFC with a request that it act as the
manager of a syndicate to put together a loan with the participation of a
number of foreign banks. KDFC intends to continue its efforts to raise a
foreign commercial loan.
46. By paying part of their dividends in the form of stocks and with
the 1973 share issue, KDFC's total won resources have increased from W 3.4
billion at inception to W 8.1 billion as of December 31, 1974 (including
the Government loan of W 2.0 billion). Its liquid won resources have always
been at least W 1.2 billion. KDFC has so far raised no private xwon resources
through borrowings. One reason was the limited demand for KDFC's domestic
currency financing owing to the availability of won funds from commercial
banks. Furthermore, the prevailing interest rate structure makes it impossible
for KDFC to raise won resources on terms that would enable it to relend ex-
cept at a substantial loss. KDFC is presently charging 15.5 percent (the
same as the standard banking rate) on its domestic currency loans, w4hereas
it would have to pay a rate of between 19 and 21 percent to sell domestic
bonds with maturities of up to three years. In view of its present won
resource position and a new share capital increase (W 1,370 million) planned
for 1976, there is no immediate need for KDFC to mobilize additional won
funds. However, KDFC is considering the possibility of going to the domestic
market in the future, perhaps in 1977, by issuing bonds for a moderate amount,
even if the resulting spread is negative, for the purpose of establishing
its name in the market and preparing itself for future resource mobilization
efforts.
47. In addition to its role in the establishment of KIFC, KDFC has
contributed to resource mobilization indirectly by persuading its clients
to increase their equity base; of the 163 existing borrowing companies,
47 have increased their share capital, many by substantial amounts. As
far as foreign currency resources are concerned, KDFC has arranged joint-
financing for ten projects to which foreign banks and investors (including
IFC) have contributed an aggregate amount of $22.6 million.
Financial Results
48. KDFC's overall financial position remains sound and its earnings
performance continues to be satisfactory. Net income after taxes increased
by 23.4 percent in 1974 to W 911.7 million, compared to W 378.7 million in
the previous year; as of December 31, 1974 KDFC's net worth was W 6.1
billion, or 10.7% more than at the end of 1973. KDFC has paid an annual
dividend of 20 percent (10 percent in cash, 10 percent in stocks) since 1959
except in 1973 when it distributed a 15 percent cash dividend.
49. As a result of the won devaluation of December 1974, KDFC's long-
term debt/equity ratio increased sharply from 4.0:1 to 4.8:1. KDFC
promptly requested an increase in the contractual limit of 4.5:1 then
in force. In view of the strength of KDFC's management and staff, the
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soundness of its portfolio, and its good financial and operational per-
formance an increase of the limit to 6.0:1 is justified under the existing
definition where the part of the Government subordinated loan of lW 2 billion
falling due after the last IBRD loan maturity is treated as equity and the
other part as debt. However, the definition of "equity" and "debt" is being
modified so as to treat the totality of the outstanding Government loan as
debt and exclude it from the equity base. A 6.0:1 ratio under the existing
definition is equivalent to about 7.0:1 under the revised definition. The
Loan Agreement (Section 4.06) therefore, provides for a debt/equity ratio
of 7.0:1.
Economic Impact of KDFC's Operations
50. As of December 31, 1974, KDFC had approved loans for 180 projects.
The additional direct employment generated by these projects is about 16,000
at an investment cost of about 1 6 million ($12,400) per job, which sug-
gests that KDFC's projects on the whole are not unduly capital intensive.
The incremental annual sales attributable to these projects are estimated
to amount to W 319 billion ($658 million) with a value added component of
1; 89.3 billion ($184 million). Of this volume of output, an estimated amount
of $358 million is exported annually. Takirg into account average annual
import requirements of about $129 million, the net positive balance of pay-
ments effect of these projects is estimated to be about $229 million annually.
51. An ex ante calculation of the economic rates of return (ERR). for
a sample of 22 projects appraised by KDFC since June 1973 showed a weighted
average ERR of 31.0 percent and a weighted financial rate of return of 24.2
percent. A joint study undertaken earlier in 1972 by KDFC and a Bank mission,
based on ex post data on a representative sample of 10 FDFC projects already
in commercial operation, also showed ERRs in excess of 30 percent for a large
majority of these projects. These returns indicate that Bank funds, through
KDFC, have generally been allocated to economically efficient projects.
Future Operations and Resource Requirements
52. KDFC estimates that, for the period up to December 31, 1977, it
will require about $103 million to meet its foreign exchange needs. The
proposed Bank loan would thus cover about half of KDFC's foreign exchange
requirements for the period. A second loan from the ADB is expected to
meet a substantial proportion of the balance, and KDFC intends to seek in
1976 a foreign commercial loan, even at a floating rate, for an amount of
$10-15 million. It is envisaged that IFC would act as a syndicate manager
and that most of the participants would be foreign banks wiho are presently
KDFC shareholders. Even thouglh such a loan would reduce KDFC's dependence
on the Bank and ADB, the scope for foreign commercial borrowings by KDFC
is likely to remain small. Consequently, KDFC will have to continue in the
foreseeable future to rely primarily on official sources of foreign exchange
to sustain the volume of operations it has projected. Its financial
position is expected to remain satisfactory during the projected period.
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53. Although the rate of inflation has been high, KDFC's relending
rate on foreign exchange loans of 10.5-11.0 percent does not appear unduly
low considering that sub-borrowers bear the exchange risk. In any event,
the level of the interest rates charged by KDFC has to be considered in the
context of the general interest rate structure prevailing in the country,
which has been the subject of discussion with the Korean authorities in
recent months. Although the interest rates on deposits have been increased
recently, the Korean authorities consider it unwise to make further upward
adjustments in the level of other interest rates at this stage largely be-
cause they are apprehensive that such a move would depress the industrial
sector which has just begun to recover from the adverse impact of the oil
shock and other recent international economic developments. Further, the
Government has pointed out that interest rates applied by banking and
financing institutions have been lowered in a number of countries in the
region as a means of stimulating their economies. Nonetheless, we have
indicated to the Korean authorities that we wish to keep interest rate levels
under review, and they have agreed to further discussions on this matter
from time to time.
54. In view of the high quality of KDFC's appraisal work and the proven
ability of its Management to make sound investment decisions, an increase in
the free limit from $0.75 million (under the latest Bank loan, No. 905-KO) to
$2.0 million is recommended (Section 2.02 (b) of the Loan Agreement). There
would be no aggregate free limit under the proposed loan. With the proposed
free limit, it is estimated that roughly one-quarter of the number of sub-
projects under this loan (accounting for about one-half of the loan amount)
would require prior approval by the Bank.
55. Besides financing direct imports of machinery and equipment,
part of the proceeds of the proposed loan would be utilized to finance an
agreed percentage representing the foreign exchange component of domestically
produced capital goods and of civil works, a practice followed in the case
of Bank lending to several other DFCs. The percentages agreed upon are
based on available data which indicate that the average foreign exchange
component is about 60 percent for machinery and equipment (including trans-
port equipment) produced in Korea, and 35 percent for local civil construction
expenditures (Section 2.02(a) of the Loan Agreement).
56. With regard to broadening its developmental impact in support of
general Government policies and programs, KDFC has formulated a development
strategy for the next two years, 1976-77, which includes, inter alia, (a)
a proposal to establish a leasing company whose object will be to lease in-
dustrial machinery to smaller firms which cannot afford outright purchases,
thus providing an important financial service to small-scale enterprises;
(b) the promotion and establishment, jointly with the Korea Institute of
Science and Technology (KIST), of the Korea Technology Advancement Corporation
(K-TAC), with the objective of advancing and exploiting commercially viable
industrial inventions and discoveries; (c) a study of the machinery industry,
to develop suitable projects for investment: (d) studies on agri-business
activities, with a view to expanding KDFC's financial assistance to this
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sector; and (e) a scheme of linkage with selected regional commercial banks
for assistance to smaller industries in backward areas. To carry out the
functions noted above, and more generally its expanding promotional activities,
KDFC has decided to create a separate unit specifically to undertake project
promotion and identification.
Justification
57. Korea's ability to make the adjustments necessitated by the de-
terioration in its terms of trade will be a crucial determinant of the suc-
cess of its efforts to sustain, albeit at a slower pace, the growth momentum
of the past decade. Industrial growth will remain one of the most important
elements in the economy. The Government's overall economic and industrial
policies (which are outlined in Parts I and III above) and, in particular,
the increased emphasis on the development of the capital and intermediate
goods industries, are appropriate for the situation in which Korea is placed
at present. KDFC, whose performance to date has been very satisfactory from
both the developmental and institutional points of view, is especially suit-
able for providing finance and guidance in the adjustment process. More
than merely an efficient intermediary to channel Bank funds to economically
and financially viable industrial projects, KDFC has made, and will continue
to make important contributions of its own toward improving both the re-
source allocation and resource mobilization systems in Korea. These con-
tributions include notably KDFC's initiative in establishing KIFC, its
role in promoting and assisting projects in the deep-sea fishing and marine
transport sectors, and its present endeavor to launch a leasing company and
to provide support in other ways for small- and medium-scale industries.
The near-term strategy it intends to implement should further broaden its
developmental outlook and enhance its contribution to the Korean economy.
58. For the future, KDFC's continued growth is not expected to be con-
strained by a lack of demand for the financing and other services it offers.
Besides the main objective of providing resources for the further expansion
of the vitally important industrial sector, the proposed loan would help to
relieve pressure on Korea's balance of payments., In addition, it would
continue to foster the mutually beneficial relationship between KDFC and the
Bank Group. As a result of that relationship, the Bank Group has been able,
after having helped establish a strong and efficient institution, to con-
tinue to exert its influence in encouraging KDFC to sustain and improve its
operational standards, to be innovative in its financing approach, to put
emphasis on the economic merits of projects seeking its assistance, and more
generally to commit itself to broader developmental objectives. Over the
period of commitment of this loan, KDFC's efforts along these lines are
expected to be intensified with the implementation of its development program
for 1976-77.
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PART V 
- LEGAL INSTRLTMENTS AN!D AUTI!ORITY
59. The draft Agreement between the Bank and the Korea DevelopmentFinance Corporation, the draft Guarantee Agreement between the Republic ofKorea and the Bank, the report of the Committee provided for in Article III,Section 4 (iii) of the Articles of Agreement of the Bank and the text of aresolution approving the proposed loan are being distributed to the Execu-tive Directors separately. Features of the Loan Agreement of specialinterest are referred to in paragraphs 49, 51 and 55.
60. I am satisfied that the proposed loan would comply with the Arti-cles of Agreement of the Bank.
PART VI 
- RECOMHENDATION
61. I recommend that the Executive Directors approve the proposedloan.
Robert S. McNamara
President
Attachments
July 1, 1975
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Other Economic Services 2.2 2.0, 2.14 3.1 5.0 Industry and Mining 188 207 18.8
Administration and Defense 76.0 75.5 76.2 65.6 65.0 Pow'er 914 105 9.5
other ~~~~~~~~~~15.0 15.3t 4.2 13.2 13.0 Transport and communications 286 387 32.0
Total Current Expenditures iTh70 i007 170-02 i7007 17002 Other 152 186 16.0
_____________ 
____________ ___  
__ ______ 
_____________ 
__________ 
Total Expendituxes 939 1,16 1i78
SE-LECTED INJDICATORS 1 961 - 1965- 1970- 1975- Fi LASIISIG N
1965 1970 1975 19-80
Average ICOR 2.7 2.3 3.-9 3.2 Thitlic Sector Savings 123 19 6.8
Import Elasticity 0.8 2.6 1.2 0.7 Domestic Borrowing 2 659 893 73.7
Marginal Domestic Savings Rate 30.7 314.8 12.14 25.0 Foreign Borrowing 157 3144 9.12
Marginal National Savings Sate 287 67 6o 2. oa nscn 939 1,1 100.0
LABOR FORCE AD
t
D Total- IBqloyment ________ Value Added Per Worker (1973 - Prices & Rxc. Rates)
~~UTPUT PRy 510R} R CsI millions, sf Total 1972 - 714 ImUDlas PretoAvag 1972 - 714
1972 19714 1972 19714 Growth rate 1972 19714 1972 19714 Grovth Bate
Agriculture 5.3 6.o 50.0 52.2 6.3 5714 572 62 53 -0.3
Industry 1.8 2.2 17. 0 19.1 10.5 1,236 1,523 133 1142 11.0
Service -1-i 3- ItS 222-L -3.0± 1 W& 1 01 -L att
Total 10.6 11.5 100.0 100.0 14.2 928 1,073 100 100
not applicable -nil or negligible - / Includes pr-ocessed primary products. 5/ Development budget.
mnot available - less than half the Based on sarchandise and non-fac~tor services. T/ Residual (Economic Repogt)
smallest omit shown / Budget Bunkering (mnanufactures)
u/l Economic functional classificatioDn of Central Gov't. Expenditure.
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Actual Projacted ab-oth Rats
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Enpo,-t (i.el. BNF) 1,1.78 2,078 3,961 5,179 5,74.4 7,365 8,782 10,5W0 12,4.96 1I,,84.8 35,213 19.9
Ž20fl2Jin-1. E ) 2 4.89 2 576 (.367 7 068 7 815 9,164. 10,3314 31 821. 13 711 15 801 33 949 1 
Tnt-ret (not) -91 -106 -123 -141 -211 -30(4 -4.08 -466 -721 -876 1,663 22.7
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__ 
~~~~~ ~ ~~~ ~~10 10 i- -t --
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7,b i. MLLT L... ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~Repayments on Public Debt 212 223 262 389 a07
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G.oornoots30 50 37 38
lappli.o.. A toin 309 37821 388 Public Debt Service 22.8 20.? 18.1 13.5 11.6
Ficoacia I iti 11 83 213 552 Total Debt Service 23.7 22.2 19.2 14.3 12.6
Bands ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ ~~~~- - - 19 TlSafIirect moast. Inc,. 26.8 24..2 20.2 15.a 14.2
'Patlbic Lon chl 2 ....1. .... J .. z 
Tctal Patlia 8621 Loans ~796 883 1,072 1,831 Averge Tens of Pabli. Debt
KITENNAL SEN? ~~~~~~~~~~Actuwj Debt Outt.,il~ no j3;1. 7(t.' as Prior Tear~ IDli 4.5 4.8 5.0 5.5 6.'
WoTrldNooL DPercb.nt Aeort. as 9 Prior Yea DfO.D 1.4.2 12.8 11.6 14.6 13.4
IDA 58.5 1.5 rEiS Debt Out. & Diebsrned 9.6 4.0.2 94.7 139.0 197.0
oADBe,ct 70.2 i.8 as 9 Public Debt 0&D 0.5 1.8 3.6 4.6 5.2
G-p -tov 1,590.9 41.7 ae 9 Public Debt Service 0.3 0.7 1.7 2.2 2.3
Etoasial Icotitatios25. 2:6 IDA Debt Out. & Dieboroed 25.6 26.7 39.9 47.1 58.5
Ban,ds 19.0 0.5 - 9 Public Debt GAD 1.5 1.2 1.5 1.5 1.5
Pablic Debt, -..i 617.2 16.2 0.0 9 Public Debt D.iebo 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
Total Pable MitT Debt 3jltrl 15
Otbor NOdT Debts 0/ 396.0
Sbart-ton Debt (diob. soWI) ~ 1,015.7
- st applicable staff estirete
sot ova tilsl - il or negligible
not avilable separtatly -- les then belf the
bat incloded LA total seallast mnit show
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KOREA
THE STATUS OF BANK GROUP OPERATIONS IN THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA
A. Statement of Bank Loans and IDA Credits (as at May 31, 1975)
Loan or US$ Million
Credit Amount (less cancellations)
Number Year Borrower Purpose Bank IDA Undisbursed
Five loans and credits fully disbursed 24.7 39.7
600 1969 ADC Irrigation 45.0 7.1
151 1969 Republic of Education 14.8 2.7
Korea
669 1970 Republic of Railways 40.0 2.8
Korea
234 1971 Republic of Livestock 7.0 .4
Korea
735 1971 KDFC Dev. Fin. Co. 30.0 .9
769 1971 Republic of Highways 54.5 1.4
Korea
283 1972 Republic of Irrigation 15.0 6.0
Korea
795 1972 ADC Irrigation 33.0 32.2
335 1972 Republic of Agricultural Credit 10.5 3.1
Korea
863 1972 Republic of Railways 40.0 11.4
Korea
905 1973 KDFC Dev. Fin. Co. 40.0 8.8
906 & 1973 Republic of Education II 23.0 20.0 42.8
394 Korea
917 1973 Republic of Ports 80.0 77.0
Korea
942 1973 Republic of Seeds Production 7.0 6.7
Korea
953 1974 Republic of Tourism 25.0 23.8
Korea
956 1974 Republic of Highways II 47.0 30.0
Korea
994 1974 AFDC Agriculture 13.0 13.0
1070/a 1975 Republic of Secondary Cities 15.0 15.0
Korea
1094 1975 Republic of Program Loan 100.0 91.8
Korea
1095a 1975 KDB Dev. Finance Co. 60.0 60.0
1096ia 1975 Republic of Third Education 22.5 22.5
Korea
llOl/a 1975 Republic of Fifth Railway 100.0 100.0
Korea -----
Total 799.7 107.0 559.4
of which has been repaid 14A .4
Total now outstanding 787j.9 *1T
Amount sold 2.0
of which has been repaid 0.8 1.2
Total now held by Bank and
IDA (prior to exchange adjustment) 783.7 106.6
Total undisbursed 527.2 3
/a Not yet effective
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B. Statement of IFC Investments (as at May 3l, 1975)
Fiscal Amount in US$ Million
Year Obligor Type of Business Loan Equity Total
1968 KDFC Development financing - 0.7 0.7
1969 Honam Silk Co. Textiles 1.4 0.3 1.7
1970 Atlas Paper Co. Pulp and paper 4.5 0.5 5.01/
1971 Korea Investment Capital market development - 0.7 0.7
and Finance Corp.
1974 KDFC Development Financing - 0.4 0.
1974 Korea Investment Capital market development - 0.3 0.3
and Finance Corp.
1975 Gold Star & Co., Electronic Products 16.0 1.3 17.3
Ltd.
1975 Korea Securities Capital market development 5.0 0.6 5.6
Finance Corp.
1975 Tong Yang Nylon Textiles 6.9 2.1 9.0
Company Ltd. --- ---- ____
Total gross commitment 33.8 6.9 407
less cancellations, terminations,
repayments and sales 9.8 .8 10.6
Total commitments now held by IFC 24.0-2/ 6.1 30.1
Total undisbursed 14.1 2.1 16.2
1/ Cancelled at the request of the Company
2/ Includes $3,000,000 additional participation
not yet finalized.
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PROJECTS IN E.XECUTION-
Loan No. 600 Pyongtaek-Kumgang Irrigation Project; US$45.0 million
Loan of May 23, 1969; Closing Date: December 31, 1976
The Project includes irrigation for about 35,000 ha, improvement
of drainage and roads, consolidation of paddy fields, benching of upland and
tidal land reclamation. Construction was delayed by a reorganization of the
executing agency and a delay in hiring consultants. The major project com-
ponents (two sea dikes, the main distribution system and pumping plants)
were largely completed by the end of 1974. Contracts for nearly all of the
remaining work have been awarded. Cost considerations have led to the exclu-
sion of about 5,000 ha of land from the project. Costs have risen from US$90
million at appraisal to about US$130 million largely because of the increased
costs of right-of-way, engineering, administration and land consolidation.
Preliminary estimates indicate increases in the price of rice will partially
offset the effects of higher costs and reduced irrigable area. The economic
rate of return is now estimated to be about 10 percent, compared with the
appraisal estimate of 14 perc:ent. The implementing agency (ADC) has re-
viewed ways of economizing on the remaining work which should lead to some
marginal cost savings. About 85 percent of the Loan has been disbursed.
Construction is progressing satisfactorily and is scheduled for completion
by mid-1976.
Credit No. 151 First Education Project; US$14.8 million Credit
of June 4, 1969; Closing Date: December 31, 1975
This Project comprises: (a) the expansion and equipping of 27
technical, commercial and agricultural high schools, 5 post-secondary
higher schools and 4 university teacher training departments; and (b) 26
man-years of technical assistance and 20 man-years of overseas fellowships
to support the development of agricultural and technical education. Project
implementation, which was slow at commencement, has improved and the project
is now 12 months behind schedule compared with the 15 months delay estimated
a year ago. All civil works, furniture procurement, technical assistance
and fellowships have been completed; 80 percent of the equipment has been
procured and the remainder is expected to be delivered during 1975. The total
project cost is estimated to remain about 3 percent below the appraisal
1/ These notes are designed to inform the Executive Directors regarding
the progress of projects in execution, and in particular to report
any problems which are being encountered, and the action being taken
to remedy them. They should be read in this sense, and with the under-
standing that they do not purport to present a balanced evaluation of
strengths and weaknesses in project execution.
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estimate. Due to delays in final equipment procurement, a further extension
of the Closing Date may become necessary.
Loan No. 669 Third Railway Project; US$40.0 million loan and
Credit No. 183 US$15.0 million Credit of May 14, 1970; Closing Date:
December 31. 1975
The bulk of the Loan and Credit was earmarked for the purchase of
freight cars, diesel locomotives, and telecommunications and track mainte-
nance equipment. Progress is generally satisfactory except for delays in
the procurement of some microwave equipment which had to be re-tendered.
Credit No. 234 Integrated Dairy Beef Development Project; US$7.0 million
Credit of February 11, 1971; Closing Date: March 31, 1977
The development of about 700 small and medium-sized dairy farms
by providing long-term loans and the construction and operation of two dairy
products processing plants are the principal components of the Project which
also includes the provision of management and technical services. Project
execution has been satisfactory. To date, about 591 farmers have participated
and farm loans of about US$4.5 million equivalent have been approved. About
4,900 head of cattle have been purchased and two dairy plants have been
constructed and are in operation. The proceeds of the Credit are almost
fully commlitted.
Loan No. 735 Third Korea Development Finance Corporation Project,
US$30 million Loan of May 14. 1971: Closing Date:
August 31. 1975
The Project is progressing satisfactorily. The Loan is fully
committed.
Loan No. 769 First Highway Project; US$54.5 million Loan of
June 29, 1971; Closing Date: November 30, 1975
The construction of approximately 370 km of national highways
between Jeonju and Busan was satisfactorily completed in December, 1973, at
a final cost about five percent above the appraisal estimate. Feasibility
studies and detailed engineering have been completed for 1,400 km and 1,100 km
of national highways, respectively. A study of road maintenance and the
establishment of a pilot maintenance organization formed the basis of the
creation of a country-wide Highway Maintenance Organization which is being
carried out under the Second Highway Project.
Loan No. 795 Yong San Gang Irrigation Project; US$33.0 million Loan
Credit No. 283 and US$15.0 million Credit of February 2, 1972; Closing
Date: September 30, 1977
This Project aims at transforming an area with the highest drought
frequency in Korea into one with year-round irrigation and crop diversifica-
tion. Also, there will be increased production of high value crops such as
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fruits and winter vegetables. Design work is proceeding satisfactorily andthe work on four dams, the main canals and land consolidation has started.Award of the three remaining major contracts anticipated for canals and landconsolidation have been delayed until this summer, with construction to startafter the rice harvest, i.e. roughly a year later than scheduled at appraisal.The delay was caused mainly by increased costs due largely to the price es-calation and design modification. The cost increases will be partiallycompensated for by benefits attributable to the enlargement of the area tobe irrigated by about 1,400 ha.; and ADC plans to reduce costs by constructingonly canals, roads and drainage systems for contour furrow irrigation on alllands exceeding 2 percent slope. (Previous watershed management studiesindicate that it would be better to bench and terrace the lands about 5 per-cent, but this is now deemed too costly.) Also the Bank has begun monitoringconstruction costs on each of the seven major civil works contracts on amonthly basis.
Credit No. 335 Agricultural Credit Project: US$10.5 million Credit ofSeptember 29, 1972; Closing Date: September 1, 1976
The Credit supports a three year lending program to small farmersto develop orchards, sericulture and mushroom production and to encouragethe breeding of poultry and swine. It also finances an organizational andaccounting study of the National Agricultural Cooperative Federation (NACF)and the strengthening of Its training facilities. The Project is progress-ing satisfactorily and its disbursement is proceeding on schedule.
Loan No. 863 Fourth Railway Project; US$40.0 million Loan ofNovember 22, 1972; Closing Date: December 31, 1976
The main elements of the Project are: electrification of linesin the Seoul suburban area; purchase of electric railcars and locomotives;the completion of electrification of 350 km of line running 'rom Seoul tothe northeastern part of Korea; track and bridge renewal; provision of yardfacilities; acquisition of passenger and freight cars; and improvement offacilities for the maintenance and repair of motive power and rolling stock.No major problems have been encountered; about 90 percent of the Loan pro--ceeds have been committed.
Loan No. 905 Fourth KD?C Project; US$40.0 miLLion Loan of June 13.1973; Closing Date: December 31, 1977
The Project is progressing satisfactorily.
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Loan No. 906 Second Education Project; US$23.0 million Loan and
Credit No. 394 US$20.0 million Credit of June 13, 1973; Closing Date:
December 31. 1977
The Project provides equipment for and extensions to the buildings
of: 18 technical and 14 agricultural high schools; ten higher schools/junior
colleges for industrial, agricultural, fishery and nursing training; colleges
of agriculture, engineering and natural sciences in nine universities and a
merchant marine college; and ten junior teacher colleges and 12 colleges of
education. It also includes pre-investment studies on health and management
education. Implementation is about seven months behind schedule due too
delays in the preparation of equipment lists (civil works, which are being
financed by the Government, are slightly ahead of schedule). The project is
encountering two problems: delays in equipment procurement and lack of
counterpart funds to cover cost overruns on civil works (about 75%). How-
ever, steps have been taken by the government and the Bank to overcome these
problems and therefore implementation should improve within the next six
months. The project is expected to be completed on schedule by the end of
1977. Disbursement has been somewhat slower than expected at appraisal due
to the delay in the preparation of equipment lists but is expected to
improve.
Loan No. 917 Ports Project; US$80 million Loan of June 27. 1973:
Closing Date: June 30. 1979
The Project includes the provision of container and bulk cargo
facilities and equipment at Busan and coal piers and handling equipment
at Busan and Mukho. Some contracts for dredging and pier construction have
been awarded. The design-work-and preparation of tender documents for the
remaining items are proceeding satisfactorily. Revised cost estimates show
an increase of about 30 percent over appraisal estimates. A Phase II Port
Development Study and consultants' services in connection with the establish-
ment of a "Korean Port Authority" are proceeding satisfactorily.
Loan No. 942 Seeds Project: US$7.0 million Loan of November 16. 1973:
Closing Date: December 31. 1978
The Project consists of: (a) the installation of five field crop
seed processing and storage facilities; (b) farm machinery for seed produc-
tion; (c) procurement of seasonal seed inventories through the operation of
a revolving fund; (d) seed testing laboratories and equipment; (e) crop
research (financed in part by USAID); (f) feasibility studies for irrigation
and area development; and (g) technical assistance. The necessary legisla-
tive and administrative action for revising the seed law and establishing
an "Office of Seed Production and Distribution" has been taken. Project
implementation is proceeding satisfactorily. Preliminary estimates suggest
that project costs would be somewhat higher than envisaged at appraisal;
the estimates are being reviewed.
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Loan No. 953 Kyongju Tourism Project: US$25.0 million Loan of
January 4, 1974; Closing Date: December 31, 1978
The Project forms part of the first phase of the planned develop-
ment of the Bomun Lake resort near Kyongju. It provides for a multi-purpose
dam; an irrigation system for about 1,200 ha; improvement and expansion of
the water supply and sewerage and solid waste disposal systems for the city
of Kyongju and the resort area; installation of electrical supply and tele-
communication facilities for the resort area; the construction and/or re-
alignment of about 57 kms of roads; infrastructure including storm water
drainage, environmental sanitation, community facilities, a golf course, a
school for training hotel personnel; and a feasibility study for the devel-
opment of tourism on Cheju Island. Final design for almost all Project
components is complete and several contracts have been awarded.
Loan No. 956 Second Highway Project; US$47.0 million Loan of
January 25, 1974; Closing Date: December 31, 1977
The Project, which forms part of the Government's 1972-76 road
construction and paving program, consists of the construction (chiefly on
new alignments) of about 130 kms and paving (largely on existing alignments)
of approximately 635 km, of national highways; feasibility studies by con-
sultants of about 1,000 kms of national and provincial roads, followed by
detailed engineering where justified; and the procurement of highway main-
tenance and workshop equipment for the extension of a new highway maintenance
program from a pilot province to the remainder of the country. All con-
struction and paving contracts have been awarded.
Loan No. 994 Integrated Agricultural Products Processing Project:
US$13.0 million Loan of June 7. 1974; Closing Date:
June 30, 1979
The Project aims at integrating the on-farm production of commercial
crops for export with efficient hygienic processing facilities using land
that is presently idle or underutilized. It comprises (i) on-farm develop-
ment of asparagus, oak mushrooms and mushrooms; (ii) construction of and
improvements to facilities to process asparagus, oak mushrooms, mushrooms and
fruits; and (iii) technical assistance including training of staff, services
of consultants, etc. The Project is progressing satisfactorily.
Loan No. 1970 Secondary Cities Regional Project; US$15.0 million
Loan of January 15, 1975; Closing Date: March 31, 1979
The principal aims of the Project are the establishment of an or-
ganizational framework for regional investnment, planning and development and
to improve working and living conditions in the secondary cities of the less
developed Gwangju region. The main elements of the Project are: (i) housing
sites and services in the cities of Yeosu, Mogpo and Gwangju (370,384 m 2);
(ii) a fishery harbor complex with industrial processing zone (215,385 m2)
in Yeosu; (iii) a city market in Suncheon City (33,160 m2); and (iv) access
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roads in Yeosu and Mogpo (6.61 km). It also provides technical assistance
to strengthen regional planning and development, to improve the utilization
of existing water supply systems in the four cities, to assist the manage-
ment and operation of the fishery complex and to carry out feasibility
studies of project proposals identified under the UNDP-financed Phase II
Regional Study. The terminal date for effectiveness of the Loan has been
extended to July 15, 1975 to provide additional time for the completion of
all the requisite conditions.
Loan No. 1094 Program Loan; US$100.0 million Loan of March 31. 1975;
Closing Date: May 1, 1976
The principal aim of the Loan is to help meet the foreign exchange
requirements of the import into the Republic of Korea by the private sector
of essential capital and intermediate goods.
Loan No. 1095 Korea Development Bank Project; US$60.0 million Loan
of March 31. 1975: Closing Date: June 30. 1979
The Project provides funds to KDB which will be used to make sub-
loans to finance direct imports for industrial sub-projects during the periol
mid 1975 to mid 1977. The Loan was declared effective on June 17, 1975.
Loan No. 1096 Third Education Project; US$22.5 million Loan of
March 31. 1975; Closing Date: June 30. 1980
The principal aims of the Project are to assist in supplying needed
skills and to establish a framework for evaluating performance and improving
the educational system. The Project consists of: (a) construction and equip-
ment of a new technical high school; (b) equipment and extension of buildings
for three agricultural junior colleges; (c) equipment and enlargement of
buildings for a fisheries college, three fisheries high schools, and equipment
for one merchant marine junior college; (d) construction and equipment of
seven new vocational training institutes; and (e) financing of engineering
and technical services required for the preparation of future education
projects. The Loan was declared effective on June 6, 1975.
Loan No. 1101 Fifth Railway Project: US$100.0 million Loan of
April 10, 1975; Closing Date: December 31. 1978
The Project will help the Korean National Railroad (KNR) continue
as a major carrier of freight and passengers by helping in: the upgrading,
modernization and expansion of track, rolling stock, motive power, and other
equipment; the improvement of the efficiency of operation; and its financial
recovery. The main components of the Project are: an increase in station
and line capacity and improvements in signalling; acquisition of rolling stock,
diesel and electric locomotives, spare parts and repair facilities; track
renewal and improvement; bridge strengthening; completion of electrification
of 71 km of industrial lines; and other miscellaneous items. This Loan is
not yet effective.
J-CT 0'1; -tkrff
Korea e;t.- iw.o¢t;.< ,F1anc irig Corporcation
Borrower: 
'cIrea Dv>-'Iopvqent Finance Corporation (KDFC)
Amount: $,, 0 :)l-on
Terms: 
'T he prcposed ' oan will bear interest at 8-l/2 percentper aanuii. Amortization to conform substantially
to the aggregate of the amortization schedu'les
al<Iicalble to the specifiic imvestmnt projects
X I.rianced out of t.ie proceeds of tLe zroposed loan.T.hle ;XItMMI repay,ment period would oe 13 years,
±ncluding three years of grace.
Purpose: 
'11Te proposed loan would be used to help cover thefore:gn exchiange requirements of industrial sub-projects to be financed by KDFC.
Es timateed
Disbursement: Calerndar Year US$ Million
?975 0.5
1976 24.2
1977 27.0
I978 3.3
Appraisal Re0por": 739-1(0, dated June 25, 1975
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